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A NEW STANDARD FOR CARDIOVASCULAR
CLAIMS IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Denis Paul Juge* and John H. Phillips, M.D.**
INTRODUCTION
Heart attack' cases present very difficult causation problems in
workers' compensation claims. The judiciary is often faced with medical
evidence in these cases which seems to resolve the causation ques-
tion but which simultaneously appears to some to produce an inequit-
able result in light of the principles underlying workers' compensation.
Louisiana has not been immune from these difficulties. The courts
of this state have faced the problem of reconciling medical evidence
in cardiovascular claims with the statutory requirement that the injury
be causally connected to the employment.
In three recent decisions, Adams v. New Orleans Public Service,
Inc.,2 Guillory v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,' and Guidry
v. Sline Industrial Painters, Inc.,' the Louisiana Supreme Court con-
fronted the problem. Adams v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. was
the first opinion to be released; however, a rehearing was granted
by the supreme court and, as of this writing, a final decision has not
been rendered. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal disagreed with the
reasoning of the Adams opinion but felt compelled to follow its holding
in Guidry v. Sline Industrial Painters, Inc.' On appeal of the third
circuit's decision, the supreme court retracted the exact language of
the Adams opinion which had compelled the third circuit to decide
in favor of the plaintiff.
The discussion which follows traces some of the developments
precipitating the original Adams opinion and describes how the con-
cept of causation in workers' compensation heart attack claims has
been changed by Guillory v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,'
the third recent decision of the supreme court. The authors also ad-
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dress the magnitude of the problem presented by cardiovascular
disease and present a description of the medical aspects of the disease.
Finally, the authors propose an alternative method by which causa-
tion in these claims should be determined.
MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM
Cardiovascular diseases account for more deaths in America than
all other causes combined. One-sixth of all sums spent by Americans
for health care in 1982 will be attributable to cardiovascular disease.7
Complete statistical data on the number and cost of cardiovascular
compensation claims are not available. However, the National Council
on Compensation Insurance did conduct a survey in 1979 on a ran-
dom sampling basis in twelve states.8 From this survey, the follow-
ing table comparing heart cases with other common injuries was
prepared:9
Average Average Average Average
Type of Number Wage Benefits Medical Costs Duration Age of
Injury of Cases In Dollars In Dollars in Weeks Claimant
Heart Cases 450 $21,395 $3,400 241 49
Arm 13,610 2,635 947 28 34
Back 29,307 2,761 1,142 39 34
All others 66,480 3,411 1,400 43 34
TOTAL 109,847 $ 3,215 $1,283 41 34
Although the survey indicated relatively few reported heart cases,
the benefits associated with such cases are great. The average wage
benefit recovered in cardiovascular cases is considerably higher than
the average benefits recovered for other injuries. The relatively lower
medical costs in heart cases may be attributed to the fact that many
of the heart cases result in death. Further, the high average age of
workers with heart claims supports the proposition that cardiovascular
catastrophes are more likely the result of the degenerative process
associated with aging.
The 4,500 cardiovascular disability claims reported to the Social
Security Administration Office in Louisiana in 1981 represent 14%
of all claims filed in this state for disability benefits."0 These figures
clearly indicate the financial impact of cardiovascular claims.
7. AMERICAN HEART ASSOCIATION, HEART FACTS, 1982; America's $39 Billion Heart
Business, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., March 15, 1982, at 53.
8. The states surveyed were Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
9. THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMPENSATION INSURANCE, DATA CLAIM CALL (April
1, 1979).
10. Social Security Administration Pre-Effectuation Review, SOC. SECURITY ST.
AGENCY OPERATING REP. (1981).
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A PRIMER ON CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASES
A reading of the judicial opinions in cardiovascular compensation
cases reveals a judiciary at times confused by medical evidence. A
proper evaluation of the legal issues involved requires a better
understanding of the present state of medical knowledge concerning
the operation of the cardiovascular system, the manifestations of car-
diovascular diseases, and their causes.
Considerable confusion exists regarding the definition of certain
terms and the understanding of various pathologic processes frequently
encountered in cardiovascular (heart and blood vessels) medicine. Some
of the most common are as follows:
Atherosclerosis and arteriosclerosis. In general, these two terms are
used interchangeably today. The lay terminology is "hardening of the
arteries." This is a chronic complex pathologic process that develops
over a period of years. It generally starts in early childhood and pro-
gresses with aging. At the present time, for practical purposes, it
is considered an irreversible process, particularly when it involves
the blood vessels of the heart. The rate of development of
atherosclerosis is influenced by certain "risk factors." The disease in-
volves arteries (vessels delivering blood to tissues, as opposed to veins,
which are vessels carrying blood away from tissue). In the process,
certain elements are deposited in the walls of arteries which pro-
gressively reduce the size of the arterial lumen (the tube or open por-
tion of the vessel which carries blood). These elements include platelets
(small particles in the blood involved in the clotting process), red blood
cells (the cells carrying oxygen to the tissues), lipids (fats which in-
clude cholesterol and triglyceride), fibrin (small linear fibrous struc-
tures), thrombi (blood clots), calcium, and others. The result is
"atherosclerotic plaque."
Risk factors. These are factors related to the rate of development of
atherosclerosis. Those associated with a more rapid development in-
clude an adverse family history or heredity (genetics), gender (males
at greater risk than females), hypertension (high blood pressure), smok-
ing (tobacco cigarettes and probably other forms of smoking), hyper-
cholesterolemia (high blood cholesterol), hypertriglyceridemia (high
blood triglycerides or neutral fats), aging, obesity, hyperuricemia (high
blood uric acid levels), oral contraceptives, diabetes mellitus ("sugar
diabetes"), lack of regular exercise, low levels of high density lipopro-
teins (HDL's, "heavy" proteins that "carry" fats in the blood), anxie-
ty, depression, stress, and excessive caffeine intake. The absence of
these factors is associated with a slowed rate of development of
atherosclerosis. For example, regular physical activity on a job and/or
in leisure time is a favorable influence for an individual. Alcohol in-
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take in moderation and regular sexual activity appear to be associated
with reduced atherosclerosis. Alcohol in excess, of course, is a signifi-
cant health hazard.
It is clear that long-term, repetitive, even strenuous, physical ef-
fort regularly performed by an individual cannot be regarded as a
causal element in the development of atherosclerosis. To the contrary,
such activity is actually beneficial in that it appears to retard the
rate of development of the atherosclerotic process. Such physical ac-
tivity is associated with a favorable change in risk factors including
lower cholesterol, lower triglycerides, higher HDL's, lower resting
blood pressure levels, slower resting heart rates, increased car-
diovascular efficiency (less energy needs for a given physical effort),
less anxiety and depression and less obesity. The concept that regular
physical activity causes "wear and tear" on the cardiovascular system
is totally invalid. The "normal" process of aging, of course, proceeds
but even this may be favorably influenced by regular physical activi-
ty. When a disease process is present, the natural progression of this
disease, even in an employed individual, clearly does not constitute
causation or aggravation relative to employment.
Vascular. This means relating to blood vessels (arteries and veins).
Coronary arteries. These are the blood vessels that carry blood (with
oxygen and other essential elements) to the heart muscle (myocar-
dium) and other heart structures.
Thrombus. This is a blood clot. It is composed of red blood cells,
platelets, fibrin, and many other blood elements. If the clot involves
a coronary artery it is termed coronary thrombosis. When this oc-
curs it usually develops on a pre-existing atherosclerotic plaque.
Embolus. This involves the development of structures in the vascular
system (e.g., clots) which physically move (embolize) to another por-
tion of the vascular system. For example, a thrombus that moves
becomes an embolus.
Spasm. This is excessive contraction of muscle. If it involves the
muscles in the walls of blood vessels it is termed vascular spasm.
If it involves the vessels supplying (arteries) blood to the heart it
is termed coronary spasm or coronary arterial spasm. It is almost
without exception a temporary (lasts only minutes) phenomenon. It
should be noted that one of several mechanisms that cause spasm, is
platelet activity in fresh thrombi. Here chemicals (e.g., thromboxane
A2) are released that are strongly vasospastic in action.
Hemorrhage. This, of course, is bleeding. It may involve extravasa-
tion of blood internally into tissues, internally into various body
[Vol. 43
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cavities, internally into body conduits (e.g., the gastrointestinal tract),
or externally with loss of blood from the surface of the body.
Occlusion. This is an obstruction. If it involves arterial vessels sup-
plying blood to the heart it is termed coronary occlusion. Coronary
occlusion may be caused by atherosclerosis, thrombosis, spasm, em-
bolus, hemorrhage under an atherosclerotic plaque, or a combination
of two or more of these and other factors.
Ischemia. This means an insufficient amount of arterial blood to meet
the metabolic needs of body tissues. If it involves heart muscle it is
termed myocardial ischemia. Ischemia may result from a decrease in
arterial supply and/or an increase in tissue metabolic demands. Cor-
onary occlusion (from whatever cause) may result in a decreased blood
supply to the heart. Increasing the work of heart muscle (e.g., from
physical exertion) increases the metabolic needs and, particularly in
the presence of coronary occlusion, may result in an insufficient supply
of blood to the heart for those increased needs. It should be noted,
however, that coronary occlusion alone frequently results in an insuf-
ficient supply of blood to the heart in the total absence of an increas-
ed metabolic demand by the heart.
Injury. This is structural damage to body tissues but the tissues con-
tinue to live (stay viable). If it involves heart muscle it is termed
myocardial injury.
Necrosis. This is irreversible damage to tissue so that it dies (becomes
non-viable). If it involves the heart muscle it is termed myocardial
necrosis.
Ischemic heart disease. This is an insufficient supply of blood to the
heart. This may result in angina pectoris, coronary insufficiency,
myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, rhythm disturbances
of the heart, death, or a combination of these.
Aggravation of a disease process. There are two basic types of ag-
gravation, one temporary and the other permanent. With temporary
aggravation, the pre-existing disorder is worsened or made more
severe for a time but with no significant residual adverse alteration
of the underlying disorder and without leaving any continuing addi-
tional impairment beyond that time. With permanent aggravation
there is a significant continuing and irreversible change in the underly-
ing disorder, thus adversely altering the future course of the disorder.
Angina pectoris. This is a reversible disorder (lasting usually one to
twenty minutes) resulting from myocardial ischemia. It generally is
caused by a temporary increase in myocardial demands (e.g., produc-
ed by physical exertion and/or emotional stress) in an individual who
19821
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has underlying fixed atherosclerotic coronary occlusive disease. Less
frequently, coronary spasm may result in ischemia sufficient to pro-
duce angina even in the absence of chronic fixed obstructive disease,
or the two processes may operate together to produce the ischemia.
During the period of ischemia the myocardial cells produce acidic
metabolites which irritate sensory nerve endings in the heart. These
in turn transmit messages to the brain which the individual inter-
prets as chest (thoracic) pain ("tightness or heaviness" in the middle
of the chest). Angina pectoris is not associated with any significant
residual structural damage to cardiac tissues. If angina develops
because of stress or work-related activities, this is considered only
a temporary aggravation. It should be noted that with initiation and
continuance of proper medical therapy (treatment) most patients with
angina pectoris may continue to work with stresses even in excess
of those they were not able to tolerate before therapy.
Myocardial infarction. This is commonly called a "heart attack." The
latter terminology should not be used when relating to other forms
of cardiac disorders such as congestive heart failure, cardiac rhythm
disturbances, or even sudden death. A myocardial infarction results
from cardiac ischemia severe enough and prolonged enough (usually
twenty minutes or longer) to produce death of heart muscle (myocar-
dial necrosis). This produces irreversible structural damage to the
heart. The patient experiencing a myocardial infarction generally suf-
fers extremely severe chest pain (similar to severe prolonged angina).
In the large majority of instances, no preceding precipitating
event can be determined or identified which initiated the myocardial
infarction. The infarction then is generally viewed scientifically as a
"natural" expression of the progression of the underlying disease, viz.,
coronary atherosclerosis. Most infarctions occur while an individual
is away from work and at rest, and thus are judged "spontaneous."
Why a myocardial infarction.began at a given moment, and not before
or after that moment, usually is not established.
Pathologic factors initiating a myocardial infarction include:
1) Progression of the chronic occlusive coronary atherosclerotic
process to a point where the blood supply to the myocardium has
become so insufficient that the cells can no longer survive.
2) Acute thrombosis in a coronary artery. This is present in about
70% of acute infarctions, and, in the majority of instances, occurs in
the vessel at a point where there was significant chronic occlusive
atherosclerotic disease.
3) Coronary arterial spasm. This is probably a factor in 30% to
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40% of infarctions, and in the large majority of cases this also occurs
at a site of pre-existing chronic atherosclerotic occlusive coronary disease.
4) An acute change in the chronic coronary atherosclerotic pro-
cess, e.g., hemorrhage, under a pre-existing atherosclerotic plaque so
as to further occlude the coronary vessel to the point that infarction
occurs.
5) A chemical change in the ability of oxygen-carrying hemoglobin
so that the blood is unable to transfer optimal amounts of oxygen
to myocardial tissue.
6) An embolus to a coronary artery.
7) A combination of two or more of the above.
8) An acute significant increase in oxygen needs of the myocar-
dium. This factor usually is not identified and, when it is, an infarc-
tion usually does not ensue without the presence of one or more of
the above factors (the latter of which are of much more
pathophysiologic importance than the increased myocardial oxygen
needs in the great majority of instances).
It is important to recognize that, after the start of the process
of acute myocardial infarction, an individual must live with this pro-
cess for 6 to 8 hours before an infarction as a cause of death can
be established by usual pathologic means at autopsy. Individuals dy-
ing before this time period frequently have died of the process which
would lead to infarction (coronary occlusion and severe ischemia) but
the infarction per se is difficult, if not impossible, to prove at autopsy.
One needs to live long enough during the infarction process for the
typical changes to develop in the heart that allow an autopsy
diagnosis of infarction to be made.
Since myocardial infarction or the process of infarction is the most
common cause of "natural death" in the United States today, from
a scientific standpoint, one has to be particularly careful when attempt-
ing to assign job-related activities a causal position. In the large ma-
jority of cases the relationship is not causal but rather only temporal,
i.e., the chance association of the job activities with the onset of the
process of infarction. In most instances, the statistical probability is
that the relationship is coincidental and if the job-related activity is
a factor, it is clearly not the only factor, and certainly the least im-
portant, of a number of much more important factors.
For the above reasons, before a causal relationship between job-
related activities and a myocardial infarction or death due to cardiac
cause should be entertained, an "unusual" event or set of events should
1982]
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have in time preceded fairly closely the onset of the pathologic pro-
cess. The farther temporally that an event and a subsequent pathologic
process are separated, the less likely a causal relationship exists. This
reasoning applies not only to myocardial infarction but to any other
disease process. From a scientific standpoint, the usual activities of
daily living (e.g., the usual activities of a job to which a person has
become accustomed over a period of weeks to years, or activities as
might appear in one's job description) should not be viewed as causally
related to the process of myocardial infarction or to death due to car-
diac causes. In establishing causation one needs to assiduously avoid
the very tempting, but most major fallacy of logic, viz., "after that
therefore because of that."
It should be emphasized that, although irreversible, a myocardial
infarction in itself is not disabling once recovery from the acute event
has taken place. An infarction (or series of infarctions) is not disabl-
ing unless it has damaged, quantitatively, enough myocardium so that
significant congestive failure is produced or medically unresponsive
angina pectoris has been produced or the propensity to cardiac rhythm
disturbances has been produced (i.e., rhythm disturbances severe
enough to cause syncope or presyncope, aggravate congestive failure,
aggravate angina pectoris, produce significant fatigue or an enhanced
propensity to sudden death).
Coronary insufficiency. This is a group of disorders that lie somewhere
between angina pectoris on one hand and myocardial infarction on
the other. Terms used in this regard include unstable angina pectoris,
pre-infarction angina pectoris, and intermediate coronary syndrome.
Disorders of heart rhythm. These are referred to as arrhythmias or
dysrhythmias. These are heart rates and rhythms that depart from
normal (termed "normal sinus rhythm") and become too fast, too slow,
or too irregular. The common symptom resulting from these is
"palpitation" (an awareness of the heart beat). Arrhythmias may be
benign and asymptomatic or may be serious and result in angina pec-
toris, myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, presyncope (sud-
den near unconsciousness), syncope (sudden unconsciousness), hypoten-
sion (low blood pressure), shock, and death. Arrhythmias may be
precipitated by physical and emotional stresses but this would be view-
ed only as temporary aggravation.
Sudden cardiac death. There are a number of definitions for this, but
an acceptable one is death from cardiac causes that results without
prior symptoms or that occurs within one hour after the onset of symp-
toms. Parenthetically, it should be emphasized that death claims
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(whether sudden death or not) should be supported by full and com-
plete autopsy findings even if this involves ultimate exhumation.
Congestive heart failure (CHF). This results when the heart fails as
a pump. Blood, in essence, "backs up" in the lungs producing
pulmonary congestion (pulmonary edema) with dyspnea (shortness of
breath). In addition, blood flow (perfusion) to body organs is reduced
resulting in lack of optimal function of these organs. Fluid is retained
in the body and frequently results in swelling (edema) of the legs and
feet (peripheral edema). The most common causes of congestive heart
failure are atherosclerotic heart disease (ASHD) and/or hypertensive
cardiovascular disease (HCVD).
Sudden severe physical efforts, for example on a job, may
precipitate acute CHF in patients with significant pre-existing heart
disease. With discontinuance of the effort and with treatment, the
CHF abates. This would be judged as temporary aggravation. With
proper treatment such an individual may return to work similar to
that which he was doing prior to the acute CHF.
Long-term repeated strenuous effort in some persons with signifi-
cant underlying heart disease may result in the onset of CHF sooner
than might have occurred without such effort expenditure. However,
at the present state of medical knowledge, it is not possible to deter-
mine precisely when the CHF would have occurred during the natural
history of the underlying disease or from the normal "wear and tear
of life" (aging process) in the absence of the indicated physical stress.
Even with the long-term physically induced CHF, the situation would
be viewed as temporary aggravation of the underlying disease pro-
cess (the latter of which, of course, would not be causally related to
the strenuous efforts).
Symptoms. These are subjective manifestations of a disease process
as expressed by a patient. The most common symptoms of heart
disease are chest pain, palpitation, dyspnea, syncope, presyncope, and
fatigue.
Signs. These are objective manifestations of a disease process as observ-
ed by a physician or other observer. Signs of heart disease are
numerous and include changes in blood pressures, changes in heart
rate and rhythm, noises from lungs (rales), heart murmurs, abnormal
heart sounds, and a plethora of abnormal laboratory test results.
Relevant Statistics
There are a number of statistics which impact importantly on car-




1) Over 40 million people currently have some form of car-
diovascular disease.
2) Over 25 million individuals are currently judged disabled due
to cardiovascular diseases.
3) Cardiovascular diseases cause more than half of all the deaths
in this country; more than all other causes of death combined (cancer,
accidents, infections, etc.).
4) There are over 1 million deaths a year due to cardiovascular
disease.
5) There are over 1 million myocardial infarctions a year in this
country and more than 600,000 victims do not survive.
6) There are over 400,000 sudden and unexpected natural deaths
in this country each year and over 95% of these are due to car-
diovascular disease. In the large majority (perhaps over 95%) of the
latter cases, no preceding initiating or precipitating event can be iden-
tified which caused the death (although in the great majority pre-
existing cardiac disease is found at autopsy).
7) There are now approximately 100 million working individuals
in this country.
In dealing with these statistics, it is important to realize that no
one dies until the heart stops (cardiac arrest). For statistical purposes
here the concept of "brain death" can be ignored. Obviously, if all
deaths are then assigned to "cardiac arrest", little light is shed on
mechanisms of death. Thus it is important to utilize the terms
"primary cardiac death" and "secondary cardiac death." In the latter
instance, for example, when a person dies of cancer or of a gun shot
wound, the ultimate cardiac arrest is termed secondary. To the con-
trary, if the death is due to heart disease, the cardiac arrest is term-
ed primary. In the latter group there are infrequent instances in which
no cardiac disease or any other cause for death can be determined,
even after careful autopsy study. This small group, then, would fre-
quently be termed "sudden unexpected death due to cardiac arrest
from unknown causes."
Medical, Legal, Sociological, and Philosophical Interfaces
In light of the statistics noted above, particularly that over half
of all deaths are due to cardiovascular disease, one needs to ponder
the following syllogism:
(1) Stress is a medically recognized cause of cardiovascular disease,
and since (2) there is no job entirely free of stress, therefore, (3)
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over half of the individuals who ever worked will die because of
their job.
Clearly the reasoning noted above is without scientific basis and
illogical. The "usual stresses" of a job, at least for the good of society,
cannot be judged as causally related to cardiovascular disease, especially
for social or legal purposes. If this were allowed, the effects on society
would be devastating. It would indicate further, for example, that of the
100 million individuals currently working in this country, over 50 million
will die (at least in part) because of their job. These numbers are multiplied
by the influx into (younger individuals) and the efflux out of (older and
dying) this period.
Chronic atherosclerotic heart disease (ASHD) and other related
cardiac disorders, as indicated above, are by far the most common
underlying cause of death in this country. In the determination of
causation in cardiovascular catastrophies (e.g., myocardial infarction
and/or cardiac death) relative to work activities, one needs to con-
sider the following. In so doing, assume that a 1000/0 "factor-effect"
would need to be exceeded ("over the cliff' syndrome or "the straw
that broke the camel's back") before the catastrophe would occur (i.e.,
in spite of the existence of adverse influences the catastrophe would
not result until a total effect exceeding 100% had developed). A few
examples are as follows:
Catastrophe occurring on the job (potential for adverse physical
and/or emotional stress):
1) Atherosclerotic heart disease 101% plus job stress 0% =
101%;
2) Atherosclerotic heart disease 99% plus job stress 2% =
101%;
3) Atherosclerotic heart disease 97% plus job stress 2% plus
something else 2% = 101%;
4) Atherosclerotic heart disease 51% plus job stress 50% =
101%;
5) Job stress 51% plus atherosclerotic heart disease 50% =
101%;
6) Job stress 99% plus atherosclerotic heart disease 2% =
101%;
7) Job stress 97% plus atherosclerotic heart disease 2% plus
something else 2% = 101%;





1) Would the catastrophe not have occurred had job stress
(physical or emotional) not been present?
2) Would the catastrophe not have occurred had atherosclerotic
heart disease not been present?
3) Would the catastrophe not have occurred had "some other" fac-
tor not been present?
In daily living away from employment, many events are reward-
ing and favorable for an individual's emotional and physical welfare.
The same applies in the workplace. All events occurring on the job
clearly cannot be viewed as adversely stressful and, indeed, some must
be favorable and rewarding to the individual's emotional and physical
welfare ("enjoy the job," "sense of fulfillment," "sense of pride," "job
well done," "economic reward," "regular exercise," etc.). When these
factors are placed in the above examples, even greater problems arise
when attempting to determine causation. Thus, consider again:
Catastrophe occurring on the job
1) Atherosclerotic heart disease 120% with favorable job
influence 19% = 101% (catastrophe occurred);
2) Atherosclerotic heart disease 120% with favorable job
influence 21% = 99% (catastrophe did not occur).
Obviously, many more examples could be given. The relevant pro-
blem, however, in dealing with workers' compensation, is which of the
above examples should be viewed as compensable?
The examples illustrate the problem for law in attempting to pro-
tect the individual on one hand and to prevent harm to society in
general on the other. For the many reasons noted above, then, the
''usual" activities involved in the performance of a job should not be
judged as causally related to cardiovascular catastrophes even if those
activities may be regarded as strenuous in comparison to nonemploy-
ment life.1
STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL BASIS FOR CARDIOVASCULAR CLAIMS
The statutory basis for workers' compensation in Louisiana
provides:
11. Further data on cardiovascular conditions is available in PHILLIPS, The Heart
and the Law: A Formula to Aid the Attorney in Establishing Causation, 33 LA. B.J.
185-189 (1975); BURCH & PHILLIPS, Angina Cerebri (pts. 1 & 2), 80 AM. HEART J. 125, 268
(1970); AMERICAN HEART ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON STRESS, STRAIN AND
HEART DISEASE 825A-835A (1977); AMERICAN HEART ASSOCIATION, IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENT
ON CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE 242A-271A (1981).
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If an employee not otherwise eliminated from the benefits of
this Chapter, receives personal injury by accident arising out of
and in the course of his employment, his employer shall pay com-
pensation in the amounts, on the conditions and to the person or
persons hereinafter designated.12
The workers' compensation act defines "accident" as "an unex-
pected or unforeseen event happening suddenly or violently, with or
without human fault and producing at the time objective symptoms
of an injury."'" "Injury" includes "violence to the physical structure
of the body."1 Heart attacks have been recognized by the courts as
personal injury by accident even though medical science may not
necessarily view the cardiovascular event as "unexpected or unfore-
seen." Therefore, the issue is whether there must be an event which
produces physical damage to the employee, or whether an accidental
result is sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements of "personal
injury by accident." Louisiana has adopted the accidental result ap-
proach in defining a heart attack as an "injury by accident," 5 a logical
view of the term accident "if accidental content can be supplied by
the unexpected effect on [an] individual."'"
ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYMENT
An employee must show that the accident arose out of and was
in the course of his employment in order to receive compensation
benefits. 7 This requirement is consistent with the compensation
principle."8 The industry in which a worker is injured should bear the
12. LA. R.S. 23:1031 (1950) (emphasis added).
13. LA. R.S. 23:1021(1) (1950 & Supp. 1975).
14. LA. R.S. 23:1021(6) (1950 & Supp. 1975).
15. Roussel v. Colonial Sugars Co., 318 So. 2d 37 (La. 1975); Leleux v. Lumbermen's
Mutual Insurance, 318 So. 2d 15 (La. 1975); Ferguson v. HDE, Inc., 264 La. 204, 270
So. 2d 867 (1972); Bertrand v. Coal Operations Casualty Co., 253 La. 1115, 221 So.
2d 816 (1969).
16. Larson, The Heart Attack Cases in Workmen's Compensation: An Analysis and
Suggested Solution, 65 MICH. L. REV. 441, 444 (1967).
17. LA. R.S. 23:1031 (1950).
18. Professors Malone and Johnson describe this principle as follows:
Workmen's compensation rests upon the sound economic principle that those
persons who enjoy the product of a business-whether it be in the form of goods
or services-should ultimately bear the cost of the injuries or deaths that are
incident to the manufacture, preparation and distribution of the product. Certain-
ly this has always been true with reference to the capital structures and the
machinery and equipment necessary to process and distribute all industrial pro-
ducts. Expected wear and tear and breakage of every sort is anticipated by the
producer and this cost is considered when he fixes the price of his commodity
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cost of compensating the worker or his dependents. Of course, an in-
jury which is not caused by the employment should not be charged
to the employer. Courts must examine each claim to determine
whether the accident arose out of and was in the course of the
worker's employment. Malone and Johnson point out that the two re-
quirements invite exploration in different directions:
The "during the course of" requirement suggests that the trier
look into the place and time the accident occurred and what the
worker was doing when he was injured, while the "arising out
of" requirement focuses on the character of the risk that brought
on the injury.
The requirement, then, is dual, and it must be satisfied in toto.
It is not enough that the accident either happened during the
course of employment or that it arise out of it. It must do both. 9
The requirement that the accident occur during the course of
employment does not present any problem in cardiovascular claims."
The real issue is whether the heart attack arose out of the employ-
ment. The "arising out of" issue presents little difficulty in most work
accidents. In Myers v. Louisiana Railway and Navigation Co.,2 the
Louisiana 'Supreme Court presented a useful guide to determining
whether an accident "arises out of" employment in most cases:
It ought to be sufficient that the nature of the employment was
such that the risk from which the injury resulted was greater
for the workman than for a person not engaged in the employ-
ment .... "2
Application of the increased risk approach of Myers to cardiovascular
claims, however, is inappropriate. Increased risk should not be the
determinative factor in cardiovascular cases; there are innumerable
other factors bearing on the "arising out of" issue.
or service.... The same should be true of the human wreckage that is involved
in production. The expected costs of injury or death to workers can be anticipated
and provided for in advance through the medium of insurance, and the premiums
can be regarded as an item of production cost in fixing the price of the commodi-
ty or service.
W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION 5 32 in 13 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 38 (1980).
19. W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 5 144.
20. A few cases are decided on this issue alone. See, e.g., Barnes v. City of New
Orleans, 322 So. 2d 821 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 325 So. 2d 584 (La. 1976)
(symptoms at work but heart attack at home; recovery allowed).
21. 140 La. 937, 74 So. 256 (1917).
22. 140 La. at 945, 74 So. at 259.
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BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO CAUSATION
A noted rule in workers' compensation is that an employer must
take a worker as he finds him.23 Thus, an employee who is abnormal-
ly susceptible to injury, such as one suffering from arteriosclerosis,
may still recover compensation if the burden of proof on the causa-
tion issue is met. The only question to be resolved in a heart attack
case has been the amount of physical stress necessary to complete
the causal link between job and heart attack. For many years, a heart
attack was not regarded as "arising out of" employment unless there
was either strenuous physical exertion or some physical exertion in
a hot environment.4
Considerable confusion developed due to the Louisiana Supreme
Court's opinion in Bertrand v. Coal Operators Casualty Co.2" The con-
fusion developed when Ferguson v. HDE, Inc.,26 cited Bertrand for the
proposition that performance of even usual and customary duties may
be sufficient exertion to conclude that an accident "arose out of"
employment. The confusion stems from the fact that the Bertrand opin-
ion did not involve the "arising out of" issue; the worker was engag-
ed in strenuous physical labor outdoors, fulfilling the then prevailing
jurisprudential requirement. Ferguson involved a heart attack at-
tributable to mental, rather than physical, stress. Further, the
Ferguson court required proof of extraordinary mental or emotional
stress to complete the causal link. Yet, the two decisions have been
cited repeatedly for the proposition that only proof of usual and
customary actions and exertions of employment are required to meet
the burden of proof on causation.
Some of the cases citing Bertrand and Ferguson for that proposi-
tion involved factual situations supporting an award of compensation
even under the older jurisprudential requirements. For example, in
Roussel v. Colonial Sugars Co.,27 the court noted the "strenuous activity"
of the plaintiff before his myocardial infarction. Also, in Leleux v.
Lumbermen's Mutual Insurance Co.,28 the plaintiff suffered a cerebral
vascular accident after engaging in strenuous physical activity.
23. See, e.g., Behan v. John B. Honor Co. Ltd., 143 La. 348, 78 So. 589 (1918).
24. See, e.g., Bryan v. Employers Casualty Co., 111 So. 2d 161 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1959); Sepulvado v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., 75 So. 2d 529 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1954).
25. 253 La. 1115, 221 So. 2d 816 (1968).
26. 270 So. 2d 867 (La. 1972).
27. 318 So. 2d 37 (La. 1975).
28. 318 So. 2d 15 (La. 1975).
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However, this language also was relied upon by some appellate
courts to award compensation in cases involving little or no strenuous
activity. The most striking example is Barnes v. City of New Orleans.'
The employee in Barnes was a clerical worker who experienced chest
pains at work and died at home the next day. The decedent was found
to have had atherosclerosis, dying as a result of a myocardial infarc-
tion. Though noting an absence of proof of any strenuous activity,
the court concluded: "[O]ur employee's condition was such that the
activity of doing not strenuous but ordinary work brought about his
infarct and death (as indeed ordinary activity at home could have done).
But the connection of work to the infarct is not any less present.,3
Adams v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc.
A new standard was presented when the Louisiana Supreme Court
released its original opinion in Adams v. New Orleans Public Service,
Inc.31 The plaintiff, an automobile mechanic for over thirty years, had
been working for NOPSI for only three months when he began ex-
periencing shortness of breath and chest pains while at work. One
evening while working the night shift, he again experienced pains in
the chest, nausea, profuse perspiration, and a "heavy smothering."
Tests conducted at the hospital the following day revealed that plain-
tiff had suffered angina pectoris due to arteriosclerosis. Plaintiff was
advised not to engage in any hard physical labor. The court
acknowledged that the plaintiff was not subject to extraordinary stress
or exertion at the time of the angina pectoris attacks. However,
the court concluded that an angina pectoris attack is an "accident"
and "the only pertinent inquiry is whether, in fact, the accident hap-
pened on the job." This holding left Louisiana with only a single test
of compensability for "heart attack" cases: whether the "heart attack"
happened at work. The court later rejected this test and developed
a new standard.
The court of appeal in Adams32 held that the plaintiff could not
recover because no incident during plaintiff's employment caused his
arteriosclerosis, or his disability resulting from the disease, because
angina pectoris attacks are only symptoms of the disease. The supreme
court rejected this rationale. Although the final opinion in Adams has
not been released, the reasoning of the supreme court on this issue
29. 322 So. 2d 821 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 325 So. 2d 584 (La. 1976).
30. 322 So. 2d at 822.
31. __ So. 2d __ (La. 1982), reh'g granted, - So. 2d -.




was not retracted in Guidry' or Guillory.' Indeed the reasoning in
Guillory is almost identical to that in Adams on the causation issue.
In Adams, the supreme court availed itself of the presumption first
enunciated in Bertrand, that where there is proof of an accident and
of a consequential disability, the accident caused the disability. The
reasoning of the court in Adams was as follows:
1) "Accident" involves an examination of whether there is an ac-
cidental result or effect on the employee, rather than whether the
disability had an accidental cause.
2) Thus, heart attack (and angina pectoris) is a compensable ac-
cident because it happens suddenly and unexpectedly and in the
course of plaintiff's employment.
3) Following this "accident", the doctor advised the plaintiff that
he should not engage in hard labor-that is, he is disabled from
engaging in his prior occupation.
4) Thus, where there is proof of an accident and of a following
disability without any intervening cause, it is presumed that the
accident caused the disability.
The court thus ignored causation. as a crucial element in the plain-
tiffs burden of proof.
Guillory and the Bertrand Presumption
The court of appeal's opinion in Guillory35 was released before
the original Adams opinion. The plaintiff was employed to excavate
for concrete slabs using a pick and a shovel. At the end of the work
day, he suddenly became dizzy, was short of breath, and fainted. A car-
diologist diagnosed syncope (fainting) caused by aortic valve stenosis.
(Stenosis reduces the flow of blood through the aortic valve. Physical
exertion places greater demands on the heart for blood. An insuffi-
cient amount of blood reached plaintiff's brain, resulting in dizziness
and fainting.)
The court of appeal noted that the attending physicians agreed
that: (1) the fainting episode probably was causally related to the
strenuous physical labor performed by the plaintiff, and (2) the plain-
tiff is now permanently and totally 'disabled. The court then applied
the Bertrand presumption-when a job related "accident" and ensu-
ing disability are proved, the disability is presumed to have been caus-
33. Guidry v. Sline Industrial Painters, Inc., __ So. 2d __ (La. 1982).
34. Guillory v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., __ So. 2d - (La. 1982).
35. 401 So. 2d 543 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
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ed by the accident, absent an intervening cause. The court also noted
that this presumption is rebuttable:
Applying these rules to the present case, we find a job related
accident and disability were proved. Thus, it is presumed the ac-
cident caused the disability, there being no evidence of any in-
tervening cause. This shifted the burden of proof to the defen-
dant to rebut the presumption. We conclude that defendant has
sustained this burden. The expert medical testimony is unanimous
to the effect that plaintiff's aortic valve disease was not caused
nor made worse by his work activities on December 15, 1978.6
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and also awarded penalties
and attorney's fees to the plaintiff. The supreme court held that the
defendant had not rebutted the presumption.
Guillory does not establish a new standard for heart attack cases,
but it does reaffirm the Bertrand presumption. This is particularly
important in cardiovascular claims in which the "accident" may be
no more than a symptom of an underlying cardiovascular disease. In
Guillory, the plaintiff experienced dizziness and fainting, symptoms
of pre-existing aortic valve stenosis. Although the supreme court
acknowledged that this condition "was not essentially different follow-
ing the fainting incident than before the accident," the court never-
theless concluded that the plaintiffs subsequent disability was caused
by the job "accident." Although the court's reasoning is somewhat
confusing, it relies heavily upon the Bertrand presumption: the plain-
tiff was asymptomatic before the accident, was disabled after the "ac-
cident" and, therefore, the accident "caused" the disability Such
reasoning defies both logic and medicine. Logic calls this method of
reasoning the inductive fallacy of false cause-post hoc, ergo propter
hoc. 7 The fallacy is rooted in the assumption that because two events
are circumstantially related to each other in time or place they are
related also as cause and effect.
The court apparently has abandoned any effort to inquire as to
whether the "accident" caused the disability. The importance of
classifying an angina attack as an "injury by accident" is evident. The
liberal statutory definition of "accident" leads the court to describe
what medicine considers only a symptom of a diseased condition as
the legal "cause" of that condition. Although three doctors testified
that Guillory's pre-existing aortic valve disease was not aggravated
36. Id. at 545.
37. Literally translated: "after this, therefore on account of this."
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or made worse by fainting, which was only a symptom of the disease,
the supreme court concluded that the disability was caused by the
fainting spell:
The ultimate determination concerning disability under the
worker's compensation statute is by the courts, not the medical
experts. The courts apply legislative definition to the medical
science in order to achieve an equitable and just result. 8
The court apparently refused to believe the medical experts' opin-
ions as to causation. The court also found that the defendant was ar-
bitrary and capricious in refusing to pay compensation benefits and
ordered him to pay penalties and the claimant's attorney fees. The
holding means that plaintiff benefits from a presumption which per-
mits him to avoid the often difficult task of proving medically a causal
relationship between the "accident" and the disability; the employer
may rebut the presumption but risks payment of penalties and at-
torney's fees if he is unsuccessful. The authors suggest that the Ber-
trand presumption be eliminated from Louisiana's workers' compen-
sation law by statutory amendment.
Guidry and a New Standard for Arising out of Employment
As a result of the courts' recognition that any cardiovascular event
(even a symptom) is an "accident by injury", and with the operation
of the Bertrand presumption to complete the causal link between
accident and disability, one question remains to be resolved: whether
the accident "arose out of' the employment. In the original Adams
opinion, the court suggested a standard which, in essence, would have
resulted in absolute compensability for all cardiovascular catastrophes
occurring at work: "Where an injury occurs suddenly or unexpectedly,
it is compensable despite the absence of stress or exertion . . . the
only pertinent inquiry is whether, in fact, the accident happened on
the job."' The above standard was expressly rejected by the supreme
court in Guidry v. Sline Industrial Painters, Inc."°
The deceased worker, Alcide Guidry, was a fifty-three year old
industrial painter whose primary duty on the day of his heart attack
was to stand on the ground near the bottom of a ladder being used
by a co-worker to insure that the ladder did not slide. All witnesses
testified that the deceased's duties did not entail any stress, strain
38. __ So. 2d at -.
39. __ So. 2d at -.
40. __ So. 2d __ (La. 1982).
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or other exertion. He made no complaints of chest pains nor showed
any other signs of exertion. While sitting in a designated smoking
area, smoking a cigarette and talking with the other workers, Guidry
suffered a sudden heart attack which resulted in his death several
weeks later.
Although there was some medical testimony to suggest a causal
relationship between the attack and the deceased's work that day,
the trial and appellate courts were more impressed with the testimony
of the other medical experts who found no evidence of a causal rela-
tionship between the acute myocardial infarction and the decedent's
employment. Despite this medical evidence, the court of appeal reluc-
tantly deferred to the controlling authority of the Louisiana Supreme
Court and its recent pronouncement in the original Adams case:
We agree with the trial court that, the preponderance of medical
evidence is to the effect that the decedent's heart attack was
neither caused nor precipitated by any activity in which he was
engaged in the course of and during his employment. However,
on September 28, 1981, after the instant case was decided by the
trial judge, our Supreme Court rendered its decision in Adams
v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. . . .reversing the judgments
of both the trial court and the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit,
and awarding disability benefits for two attacks of angina pec-
toris which the plaintiff suffered while at work. . . .This court,
of course, is obliged to follow and apply the law as interpreted
by the Louisiana Supreme Court.'
In a footnote, the author of the Guidry appellate opinion expressed
his belief that Adams was contrary to the "compensation princi-
ple": "The writer of this opinion disagrees strongly with the decision
in the Adams case, believing that the majority opinion disregards the
legislature's explicit intention that an employee's disability must be
caused in some way by his employment in order for him to recover
workmen's compensation benefits from that employer."4
The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff:
not for the reason relied upon by the Court of Appeal and espous-
ed originally in Adams (that the accident happened on the job and
nothing more is required) but rather for the reason that Guidry's
41. 406 So. 2d at 304-05.
42. 406 So. 2d at 305, n. 1.
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myocardial infarction both occurred on the job and was causally
related in some measure to physical stress, strain or exertion of
his job. .. In achieving this result in the case under considera-
tion, we expressly reject the following language in Adams on
original hearing:
"Where an injury occurs suddenly or unexpectedly it is com-
pensable despite the absence of any physical stress or exertion,
'and' [t]he only pertinent inquiry is whether, in fact, the accident
[heart attack] happened on the job."43
The court reviewed the history of cardiovascular compensation
claims and acknowledged the confusion created by the language in
Bertrand and Ferguson that only the "usual and customary actions,
exertions . . . of the employment" are required for an accident to be
causally related to the employment. The Guidry court nevertheless
asserted that the supreme court had never taken the position "that
the absence of physical stress or exertion is of no moment," or that
the occurrence of a heart attack on the job is the only relevant inquiry:
[I]n summary the jurisprudence of this court has been fairly
liberal in linking ensuing disability to admitted work accident (for
example, there is the Bertrand presumption of causal connection
between accident and disability), and insofar as linking work acci-
dent to work stress and exertion without the necessity for a
traumatic incident. But there has been in this court's jurisprudence
no determination that there exists a presumption that a heart ac-
cident sustained at work is caused by the employment. Also, ex-
cept for Adams on original hearing, the cases in this court have
always required that there be some causal relation between
employment and accident."
The court specifically denied that Louisiana jurisprudence
recognizes a presumption that a vascular accident occurring while at
work is caused by the employment. "There must be a causal link be-
tween the employment, or the work, and the accident." 5 The court
also reaffirmed that the plaintiff in a compensation case, as in other
civil cases, has the burden of proving that causal link by a
preponderance of the evidence:
This burden of plaintiff's is to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the work effort, stress or strain in reasonable prob-
ability contributed in some degree to the heart accident. Anything
43. __ So. 2d at __.
44. Id. at
45. Id. at __.
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less and it can hardly be said that the accident arose out of the
employment or that the employment in any measure contributed
to the accident."
The importance of the Guidry decision is reflected in the follow-
ing statement by the court:
If the physical exertion, stress, or strain on the job, and
preceding the infarction, is no more than the worker would likely
have experienced in a non-work situation, the attack may be the
result of the natural progression of the pre-existing disease rather
than the result of the employment activity.
This reality has led Professor Larson to suggest a rule which
we draw upon to resolve this amorphous legal problem. See
generally: 1B A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Sec. 38.83, 7-233
(1980).
For the heart accident to arise out of or be connected with the
employment, the exertion stress or strain, acting upon the pre-
existing disease, must be of a degree greater than that generated
in everyday non-employment life (e.g., as compared to the more
or less sedentary life of the average non-worker).
In other words if the activities in which the worker with a pre-
existing heart disease is engaged, whether for his job usual and
customary or not, entail exertion, stress or strain greater than
would be involved in everyday non-employment life and he ex-
periences a heart accident, he has made a prima facie showing
that the accident arose out of or was connected with, the
employment. 7
Since Louisiana apparently now has adopted the standard suggested
by Larson, a review of that proposal may be useful.
While acknowledging the practical concern that heart cases and
related types of injury and death will become uncontrollable unless
some kind of arbitrary boundary is set, Professor Larson has rejected
the "unusual strain" standard and proposed his own solution to this
problem. Larson begins his proposal with a recognition of the fact
that, "while limits must be put on heart liability, the essence of the
problem is causation."" Causation is divided by Larson into two
46. Id. at -.
47. Id. at -
48. Larson, supra note 16, at 468-69.
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distinct parts, the legal and the medical: "The law must define what
kind of exertion satisfies the test of 'arising out of the employment'
then the doctors must say whether the exertion which has been held
legally sufficient to support compensation has in fact caused the heart
attack." 9
Larson's legal test for causation 'involves an examination of the
worker's heart condition before employment. If the circumstances in-
dicate that the claimant had a previously weakened or diseased heart,
compensation for a heart attack would be available only if the employ-
ment contribution to the event is greater than that of nonemploy-
ment life. If there is no personal causal contribution (i.e., no prior
weakness or disease), any exertion that is connected with employment
and is, to any degree, medically connected with the collapse would
be adequate to satisfy the legal test of causation. This part of Lar-
son's proposal was also cited by the Guidry court, but whether this
test will be applied to future cases remains to be seen. The medical
aspect requires a showing that "whether or not there was prior per-
sonal weakness or disease .... medically the particular exertion con-
tributed causally to the heart attack."'
Larson's standard has some attractive features. It does not employ
a presumption to avoid the causation issue and the burden of proof
remains with the plaintiff. His standard also recognized the inequity
in placing the full economic burden on the employer where a worker
has a history of cardiovascular disease and the work exertion
preceding the heart attack is minimal. However, in an effort to create
a universal standard, Larson uses a comparigon between the particular
employment exertion at issue with "the exertions present in the nor-
mal nonemployment life of this or any other person."5' Larson has been
critical of the "usual-unusual strain" test because "the distinction
assumes that there is a quantum of exertion or exposure in any oc-
cupation which is usual or normal-an assumption which is ques-
tionable at best, and certainly difficult to apply."'" Nevertheless, it is
not clear how Larson's standard will be any easier to apply.'
49. Id. at 469.
50. Id. at 470.
51. Id.
52. A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION S 38.63 (1980).
53. To illustrate this standard, Larson presents two workers, X and Y. X normal-
ly lifts 200 pounds during the work day; Y does no lifting at all. On a particular day
at work X lifts 200 pounds and suffers a heart attack. Y, also at work, lifts 15 pounds
1982]
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Larson's proposal is preferable to prior Louisiana jurisprudence
which recognized the compensability of a cardiovascular "accident"
occurring at work even if there was no exertion. However, Larson's
proposal is faulty in two respects. It also demonstrates the fallacious
belief that strenuous labor has a long-term detrimental effect on the
cardiovascular system.
Larson seeks to examine particular job stress, but does not ex-
amine that stress as it relates to a particular individual. Individuals
are able to accommodate themselves over a period of time to physical
stresses." In addition, individuals react differently to emotional
stresses." Therefore, it is necessary to place the numerators (e.g.,
stress) with their denominators (reactivity of the individual). To con-
sider only if the exertion is the type that is present in the "normal
nonemployment life of this or any other person" is to ignore medical
realities.
Larson's proposal also assumes that where there is no history of
cardiovascular disease, any exertion producing heart failure should
be compensable. He recognizes that doctors may say that there must
have been such a history, on the theory that a healthy heart could
not have given way under the particular exertion. Cardiologists main-
tain that where there is altered function in an organ, one would also
expect to find altered structure even if there were no apparent
symptoms." Larson's response is a suggestion that the party alleging
the existence of a prior heart condition should have the burden of
proving an altered structure. The practical effect of Larson's sugges-
tion is an irrebuttable pre'sumption against the employer because he
does not have the discovery tools necessary to present a defense (e.g.,
and suffers a heart attack. Larson states that, under the usual-unusual strain test,
X would not recover compensation because this activity was not unusual for this par-
ticular worker. However, he suggests that, using this test for Y, there would be recovery
because lifting 15 pounds would be regarded as unusual for this particular worker.
Larson also suggests that X would meet the legal test for causation because lifting
200 pounds is not an exertion present in normal nonemployment life of this or any
other person; Y would not meet the test if he had personal risks that contributed
to his heart attack because lifting 15 pounds is something to be expected in normal
nonemployment life. But if Y had no prior history of heart disease, compensation would
be awarded since the employment contributed something to the employee's collapse
and his personal life contributed nothing. See A. LARSON, supra note 53, at 470.
54. See text at pages 19-20, supra.
55. Medical studies to quantitate individual responses to stress, such as those
being conducted by Dr. Robert Elliq.t of the University of Nebraska, are currently
in progress.
56. See text at pages 19-25, sutpra.
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compulsory autopsy).57 Thus, Larson's suggestion produces the same
erroneous result as the Adams court's reasoning.
AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
Medically, the term "cause" may be considered as that activity
or agent without which a condition would not have appeared." To
philosophers of metaphysics, a cause must not only be sufficient for
the occurrence of an event, but also necessary: X is only the cause
of Y if X is always followed by Y, and also Y never occurs unless
X has occurred. 9 The "common-sense" notion views a cause as essen-
tially something which intervenes in the normal course of events.
In adopting a particular concept of causation in law, one is re-
quired to go beyond a metaphysical inquiry. The legislator or judge
is faced with the question of public policy. In drafting the various
compensation acts of the states, legislatures placed a legal obligation
upon every employer for all injuries, diseases, or deaths which are
associated with that particular employment. This obligation exists even
if the employer is without fault. The sole criterion is a showing that
the injury, disease, or death was causally connected with the employ-
ment.
The unresolved issue in Louisiana is how to approach the case
in which a workman's pre-existing heart disease has advanced to the
extent that any strain, or some other incident of employment, becomes
57. Larson recognized the difficulty of this burden of proof and suggested that
more frequent use of autopsies "may be justified in cases in which this issue can be
foreseen." Larson, supra note 16, at 473.
Several states have incorporated provisions for the use of autopsies in compensa-
tion cases where cause of death is an issue. Georgia permits this practice, but pro-
vides no penalty for refusing to permit an autopsy. GA. CODE ANN. SS 114-503 (Supp.
1931). In Employees Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Carson, 111 S.E.2d 918 (Ga. Ct. App.
2d Div. 1959), the court refused to withhold benefits for refusal to permit an autopsy
because the statute did not permit such action. Without some enforcement mechanism
the autopsy provisions are meaningless.
Other states which have authorized autopsies are: ALASKA STAT. S 23:30.95(e) (Supp.
1981); IDAHO CODE S 72-449 (1973); IND. CODE ANN. S 22-3-3-6 (West 1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 38, S 6 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1982) (autopsies in "work-related" deaths); MINN. STAT.
ANN. S 176:155.64 (West 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. S 287.210 (Vernon 1981); NEB. REV. STAT.
S 48-135 (1978); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. S 62-8-41 (1978); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
8307 sec. 14 (Vernon 1967).
58. AMERICAN HEART ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON STRESS, STRAIN AND
HEART DISEASE, 1976.
59. See H. HART & A. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 18 (1959).
60. Id. at 27.
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the "final straw" which precipitates a heart attack. Most physicians
will agree that various facets of a workman's job can bring an ad-
vanced stage of heart disease to its climax. The policy question is
at what point, for compensation purposes, shall the element of work-
connection be viewed as de minimis and the cardiac disability held
to be merely coincidental with, rather than "caused" by, the work-
connected event?
Professor McNiece has stated:
A basic issue which underlies much of the controversy surround-
ing possible solutions to the cardiac problem is whether cardiac
disorders and their effects among the working class truly present
a question of industrial injury, or whether in reality, they repre-
sent a broad public health problem with only a peripheral rela-
tionship to workmen's compensation. 1
The Guidry standard will have the effect of finding all but perhaps
office and sedentary employment to be sufficiently stressful to pre-
sent a prima facie case for the plaintiff that the heart attack arose
out of the employment. Although this standard is certainly preferable
to that of the original Adams opinion, it is not supported by medical
evidence and should be overruled by a legislatively-created standard.
One such standard was adopted by the Nevada Legislature in its
definition of "injury by accident": "[Flor the purposes of this chapter,
coronary thrombosis, coronary occlusion, or any other ailment or
disorder of the heart, and any death or disability ensuing therefrom,
shall not be deemed to be an injury by accident sustained arising out
of and in the course of the employment."62 The definition expresses
the Nevada Legislature's dissatisfaction with any standard, even one
that requires a showing of unusual stress or strain, for heart claims.
Many states have allowed their judiciary to adopt either the "usual
strain" standard or the requirement of "unusual strain." Others have
incorporated into their workers' compensation statute a particular stan-
dard to be applied in cardiovascular claims. Arizona, for example, has
a special provision for heart-related claims:
A heart-related or perivascular injury, illness or death shall not
be considered a personal injury by accident arising out of and in
the course of employment and is not compensable pursuant to this
chapter unless some injury, stress or exertion related to the
61. H. MCNIECE, HEART DISEASE AND THE LAW 110 (1961).
62. NEV. REV. STAT. S 616.110 (1979) (emphasis added).
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employment was a substantial contributing cause of the heart-
related or perivascular injury, illness or death. 8
Colorado presents the following test in its statute: "'Accident,' 'in-
jury,' and 'occupational diseases' shall not be construed to include
disability or death caused by heart attack unless it is shown by com-
petent evidence that such heart attack was proximately caused by
an unusual exertion arising out of and within the course of the
employment."" Similar provisions are found in the state compensa-
tion statutes of Kansas,' Michigan,' New Jersey,67 and North Dakota.'
While not pronouncing a standard for heart claims, the statutes of
Mississippi 9 and Nebraska"0 do express a rejection of any presump-
tion that the occurrence of a heart attack at work is causally related
to the employment.
The present Louisiana jurisprudence, if not substantially altered
63. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 23.1043.01 (Supp. 1980) (emphasis added).
64. COLO. REV. STAT. S 8-41-108 (Supp. 1981) (emphasis added).
65. KAN. STAT. ANN. S 44-501 (1981) provides: "Compensation shall not be paid in
case of coronary or coronary artery disease or cerebrovascular injury unless it is shown
that the exertion of the work necessary to precipitate the disability was more than
the employee's usual work in the course of the employee's regular employment."
66. MICH. STAT. ANN. S 17.237 (401) provides: "Mental disabilities and conditions of
the aging process, including but not limited to heart and cardiovascular conditions,
shall be compensable if contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by the employ-
ment in a significant manner."
67. N.J. STAT. ANN. S 34:15-7.2 (West 1981) provides:
In any claim for compensation for injury or death from cardiovascular or cerebral
vascular causes, the claimant shall prove by a preponderance of the credible
evidence that the injury or death was produced by the work effort or strain in-
volving a substantial condition, event or happening in excess of the wear and
tear of the claimant's daily livin'g in reasonable medical probability caused in a
material degree the cardiovascular or cerebral vascular injury or death resulting
therefrom.
68. N.D. CENT. CODE S 65-01-02 (Supp. 1981) provides: "If an injury is due to heart
attack or stroke, such heart attack or stroke must be causally related to the worker's
employment, with reasonable medical certainty, and must have been precipitated by
unusual stress."
69. MISS. CODE ANN. S 287.020 (19 ) provides:
The said terms shall in no case except as herein provided be construed to in-
clude occupational disease in any form, . . .nor shall they include death due to
natural causes occurring while the workman is at work.
70. NEB. REV. STAT. S 48-151 (1978) provides:
The terms [injury and personal injury] shall not be construed to include disability
or death due to natural causes but occurring while the employee is at work, nor
to mean an injury, disability or death that is the result of a natural progression
of any pre-existing condition.
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by the supreme court in the final Adams opinion, should be overruled
by legislative enactment. A standard similar to that of Arizona or
Colorado would be in keeping with the compensation principle and
would more closely reflect the true medical relationship between
employment and cardiovascular catastrophes. A job stress should be
unusual before the responsibility for a resulting heart attack is placed
on the employer. It should be a stress that is severe, unexpected
and unaccustomed. Further, public policy (i.e., limiting the financial
cost of doing business in this state) demands that a rational standard
in the administration of cardiovascular compensation claims be
established. The financial cost of these claims is staggering in com-
parison to all other types of compensation claims. To suggest that
we should define cardiovascular events as "accidents" and impose a
series of presumptions to bring almost all cardiovascular catastrophes
into the compensation system is to ignore the scientific laws of causa-
tion and discourage industrial development in this state. The alloca-
tion of responsibility for these events is clearly a task for the
legislative branch of our government, and legislative initiative is clearly
needed in this area of our workers' compensation law.
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